In a proxy re-encryption (PRE) 
INTRODUCTION
Encryption is used as a building block of any application requiring confidentiality. Let pk i and pk j be two independent public keys. As pointed out by Mambo and Okamato in [15] , it is a common situation in practice where a data encrypted under pk i is required to be encrypted under pk j (j ≠ i). When the holder of sk i is online, E i (m) is decrypted using sk i and then message m is encrypted under pk j giving E j (m). But in many applications like encrypted mail forwarding, secure distributed file systems, and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam, when the holder of sk i is not online, this has to be done by an untrusted party.
In 1998 Blaze, Bleumar, and Strauss [9] introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE). A re-encryption key (rk i,j ) is given to a potentially untrusted proxy so that the proxy can transform a message m encrypted under public key pk i into an encryption of the same message m under a different public key pk j without knowing the message. A PRE scheme can be of two types -unidirectional and bidirectional. The former is a scheme in which a re-encryption key (rk i → j ) can be used to transform from pk i to pk j but not vice versa and the latter is a scheme in which the same re-encryption key (rk i ↔ j ) can be used to transform from pk i to pk j and vice versa. The re-encryption algorithm can be of two types -single hop, in which the re-encrypted ciphertext cannot be further re-encrypted and multi hop, in which the re-encrypted ciphertext can be further re-encrypted.
PRE can be used in many applications, including simplification of key distribution [9] , key escrow [13] , multicast [19] , distributed file systems [3, 5] , security in publish/subscribe systems [4] , secure certified email mailing lists [20, 23] , the DRM of Apple's iTunes [22] , interoperable architecture of DRM [21] , access control [11] , and privacy for public transportation [7] . Hohenberger and others published a result of securely obfuscating re-encryption [16] , which is the first positive result for obfuscating an encryption functionality. Shao and Cao have proposed a unidirectional PRE scheme without pairing [2] . Matthew Green and Giuseppe Ateniese have proposed a PRE scheme for ID-based cryptosystems [18] .
Ran Canetti and Susan Hohenberger proposed a definition of security against chosen-ciphertext attacks for PRE schemes and presented a scheme that satisfied the definition [1] . In 2009, Jian Weng and others [14] introduced the concept of C-PRE, whereby Alice has a fine-grained control over the delegation. As a result, Alice can flexibly assign Bob the decryption capability based on the conditions attached to the messages using a proxy. For example, suppose Alice is on a vacation. She can make Bob to read only those messages which have the keyword "urgent" in their subject. This flexible delegation is obviously not possible with PRE schemes. In this paper, two separate keys are used -a partial re-encryption key and a condition key. The message can be delegated by the proxy only if both the keys are known.
Later in 2009, Jian Weng and others published a break of the scheme in [14] and gave a new scheme for C-PRE [17] , which combines the re-encryption key and the condition key into a single key, which is then used for re-encryption. Also Cheng-Kang Chu and others in [8] introduced a generalized version of C-PRE named conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption (CPBRE), in which the proxy can re-encrypt the ciphertexts for a set of users at a time.
In this paper, we propose an efficient C-PRE scheme (single-hop and unidirectional) which uses significantly less number of bilinear pairings when compared to the existing schemes in [14] and [17] . Our scheme, as in [14] , uses two separate keys for re-encryption.
Our Results
Let us briefly describe a C-PRE scheme. A C-PRE scheme involves a delegator (say user U i ), a delegatee (say user U j ) and a proxy. A message sent to U i with condition w is encrypted by the sender using both U i 's public key and w. To re-encrypt the message to U j , the proxy is given the re-encryption key (rk i → j ) and the condition key (ck i,w ) corresponding to w. Both the keys can be generated only by U i . These two keys form the secret trapdoor to be used by the proxy to perform translation. Proxy will not be able to re-encrypt cipher texts for which the right condition key is not available. Thus U i can flexibly assign U j the decryption rights by setting condition keys properly. The scheme works in practice as follows: the message encrypted for U i is first handled by proxy and under appropriate conditions the proxy transforms the ciphertext into a ciphertext for U j . However, proxy will obtain no information about the original message. While it is some what easier to design a PRE without pairing, designing C-PRE requires pairing based operations crucially. We have used a few constructions from [12] which drastically reduces the number of bilinear pairings. Table 1 compares the number of bilinear pairings and exponentiations between the scheme in [17] and our scheme. Although the number of exponentiations in our scheme is slightly more, it is insignificant when compared to the reduction in number of bilinear pairings. Thus, our scheme is more efficient than the existing one. We then formally prove the security of our scheme. We have slightly modified the security model in [14] , as discussed in Section 3.
The C-PRE scheme in [14] has a break as given in [17] . Scheme in [17] has combined the two keys into a single key. Having the keys separate has an advantage. The delegation power of the proxy can be controlled. One of the two keys can be given to the proxy for partial re-encryption and the other key can be given to a third party for full re-encryption. Since the scheme in [14] has a break, our scheme is the only existing scheme having this unique property.
PRELIMINARIES
Bilinear Groups and Bilinear Pairings: Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G × G → G T with the following properties.
− Bilinearity: We have
− Non-degeneracy: There exist g 1 , g 2 ∈ G such that 1 ) g , (g ê 2 1 ≠ ; − Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute
Modified Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem: Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with a prime order q. Let g be the generator of G, The mCDH problem in G is as follows:
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b ∈ * q Z , the random choice of g ∈ G and the random bits of A.
Modified Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem: Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order q. Let e : G × G → G T be an admissible bilinear map and let g be the generator of G. The mCBDH problem in (G, G T , e) is as follows:
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈
Security Notions
The following game between an adversary A and a challenger C is used to define the semantic security of our C-PRE scheme against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Setup. C takes a security parameter λ and runs the algorithm GlobalSetup(λ) and gives the resulting global parameters param to A. Phase 1. A adaptively issues queries q 1 , …, q m where q i is one of the following: − Uncorrupted key generation query: C first runs algorithm KeyGen (i) to obtain the public/secret key pair (pk i , sk i ), and then gives pk i to A. − Corrupted key generation query: C first runs algorithm KeyGen (j) to obtain the public/secret key pair (pk j , sk j ), and then gives (pk j , sk j ) to A. − Partial re-encryption key generation query (pk i , pk j ): C runs the algorithm ReKeyGen(sk i , pk j ) and returns the generated re-encryption key rk i → j to A. Here sk i is the secret key corresponding to pk i . − Condition key generation query (pk i , w): C runs the algorithm CKeyGen(sk i , w) and returns the generated condition key ck i, w to A.
−
Re-encryption query (pk i , pk j , w, ζ i ): C runs the algorithm ReEncrypt(ReKeyGen(sk i , pk j ), CKeyGen(sk i , w), ζ i ) and returns the generated ciphertext ζ j to A. − Decryption query (pk, w, ζ) or (p k , ζ): C runs the algorithm Decrypt(sk, ζ) and returns its result to A. Here (pk, w, ζ) and (pk, ζ) are queries on original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts respectively.
For the last four queries it is required that pk, pk i and pk j are generated beforehand by the KeyGen algorithm.
Challenge. Once A decides Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pk i* , a target condition w * and two equal-length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M. C flips a random coin δ ∈ {0, 1}, and sets the challenge ciphertext to be ζ * = Encrypt(pk i* , m δ , w * ), which is sent to A.
Phase 2:
A adaptively issues queries as in Phase 1, and C answers them as before.
Guess:
Finally, A outputs a guess δ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if δ′ = δ. Adversary A is subject to the following restrictions during the above game.
1.
A cannot issue corrupted key generation queries on i* to obtain the target secret key sk i* .
2.
A can issue decryption queries on neither (pk i* , w * , ζ * ) nor (pk j , ReEncrypt(rk i* → j, ck i*,w* , ζ * )). 3. A cannot issue re-encryption queries on (pk i* , pk j , w * , ζ * ) if pk j appears in a previous corrupted key generation query. 4 . A cannot obtain the partial re-encryption key rk i* → j if pk j appears in a previous corrupted key generation query.
We refer to the above adversary A as an IND-CPRE-CCA adversary. A's advantage in attacking our CPRE scheme is defined as
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by the adversary and the challenger. As in [14] , we also distinguish between two types of IND-CPRE-CCA adversaries as follows:
− Type I IND-CPRE-CCA adversary: In the game, adversary A does not obtain the reencryption key rk i* → j with pk j corrupted. − Type II IND-CPRE-CCA adversary: In the game, adversary A does not obtain both the condition key ck i*, w* and the re-encryption key rk i* → j with pk j corrupted.
AN EFFICIENT C-PRE SCHEME
Here we present our efficient C-PRE scheme and then prove its security.
Construction
Our proposed scheme consists of the following seven main algorithms and one auxiliary algorithm for checking the validity of the ciphertext.
Global Setup (λ) : This algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input. Then two primes p and q are chosen such that q | p−1 where q is a λ bit prime. Then the algorithm generates (q, G, G T , e) where G and G T are two cyclic groups with prime order q and e is a bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T . Let g be the generator of group G, which is a subgroup of * q Z with order q. Choose hash functions as follows:
: H , and . ReKeyGen(sk i , pk j ) : The re-encryption key rk i → j is generated as follows: pk .
4. Compute E = s + zH 4 
Validity():
This algorithm implicitly takes all the inputs of the calling algorithm as its input and works as follows:
ReEncrypt(rk i → j , ck i, w , ζ i , pk i , pk j ): This algorithm re-encrypts ζ i to ζ j as follows: − ζ is the original ciphertext in the form ζ = (A, B, C, D, E).
holds, return m; else return ⊥.
− ζ is the re-encrypted ciphertext in the form ζ = (A′, C′, V, W). Correctness: The proxy must have both the right re-encryption key and the condition key to reencrypt a ciphertext to the delegatee. Otherwise, the delegatee will not be able to decrypt the ciphertext with non-negligible probability. Suppose a proxy has the re-encryption key rk i → j and the condition key ck i, w′ (w′ ≠ w), he will generate the re-encrypted ciphertext ζ j = (A′, C′, V, W) as
Note that the two H 7 terms do not cancel each other implying that C′ ⊕ )
′ in the decryption algorithm will not reveal the message m with overwhelming probability. The resulting value will also not pass the condition checks. Hence the delegatee cannot decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext with high probability.
Security intuitions:
It is impossible for the adversary to manipulate the ciphertext. This is because the validity of the original ciphertext can be publicly verified by the Validity() algorithm. Thus our scheme can ensure chosen-ciphertext security. Even if the conditional key w is changed to another value w′ by the adversary, the scheme is secure because w is a parameter for H 2 and when w changes the value of r also changes.
Security
The proposed C-PRE scheme is IND-CPRE-CCA secure in random oracle model. This follows directly from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. H with i ∈ {1, ..., 7} which are initially empty, and responds as below: (x i, 1 , x i, 2 ) ). − Re-encryption key generation query (pk i , pk j ). If R list has an entry for (pk i , pk j ), return the predefined re-encryption key to A. Otherwise, algorithm B acts as follows:
1. Recover tuples (pk i , x i, 1 , x i, 2 , c i ) and (pk j , x j, 1 , x j, 2 , c j ) from K • Compute V = g v and W = ) (pk H v j, 2 3 ⊕ (h || π).
• Since the ciphertext is valid, issue a decryption query (pk i , ζ i ) and get message m.
• Pick AskH did not occur, where δ and r′ are chosen by B in the challenge phase. 1. Secret key sk j is unknown to A since c j ≠ '−'. 2. h is encrypted under pk j using the "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme. So, if A can distinguish rk i → j from j i k r → ′ , it means that A can determine (V, W) is an encryption of h or h′, which breaks the CCA security of the "hashed" ElGamal based on the CDH assumption.
The re-encryption queries are also perfect, unless A can submit valid original ciphertexts without querying H 2 or H 3 (denote this event by REErr). This is because we issue a decryption query in the third case of the re-encryption query. We will calculate Pr[REErr] shortly.
The simulation of the decryption oracle is perfect, with the exception that simulation errors may occur in rejecting some valid ciphertexts. AskH happens, algorithm B will be able to solve mCDH instance. Therefore we get, • (c i = 0 ∧ c j = 1): Output "failure" and abort.
− Condition key query (pk i , w). If C list has an entry for (pk i , w), return the predefined condition key ck i,w to A. Otherwise algorithm B acts as follows:
1. Recover tuples (pk i , x i,1 , x i,2 , c i ) from K list and (w, pk i , t, S, coin) from list 6 H . 2. It constructs the condition key ck i,w for adversary A according to the following cases:
• c i = 1: Algorithm B responds with
• If (c i = 0) does not hold, issue a condition key generation query (pk i , w) to obtain ck i,w and a re-encryption key query (pk i , pk j ) to obtain rk i → j , and then ReEncrypt(rk i → j , ck i,w , ζ i , pk i , pk j ) to A. 3. Else B does the following.
• Pick pk ) ⊕ (h || π).
• Pick . Here we assume that probability of a key being uncorrupted is same as θ in H 6 queries and 1−θ if it is a corrupted one.
The simulation of the re-encryption key queries is same as the real one, except for the case (c i = 0 ∧ c j = 0), in which the component (1) j i rk → is chosen by choosing h randomly, where h is defined as ah′. If Abort does not happen, this is computationally indistinguishable from the real world because :
1. Secret key sk j is unknown to A since c j ≠ 1. 2. h is encrypted under pk j using the "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme. So, if A can distinguish rk i → j from j i k r → ′ , it means that A can determine (V, W) is an encryption of h or h′, which breaks the CCA security of the "hashed" ElGamal based on the CDH assumption. The re-encryption queries are also perfect, unless A can submit valid original ciphertexts without querying H 2 or H 3 or H 7 (denote this event by REErr). This is because we issue a decryption query in the third case of the re-encryption query. We will calculate Pr [REErr] shortly.
The simulation of the decryption oracle is perfect, with the exception that simulation errors may occur in rejecting some valid ciphertexts. A can submit valid original ciphertexts without querying H 2 or H 3 or H 7 (denote this event by DErr). Let Valid be the event that the ciphertext is valid. Let AskH 7 , AskH 3 , and AskH 2 be the events abc g) (g, ê has been queried to H 7 , g r has been
queried to H 3 , and (m, r′, w) has been queried to H 2 respectively . We have, 
